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STORAGE DEVELOPER CONFERENCE

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Mitigating Ransomware Attacks at the Block Level with OpenZFS

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What is Ransomware?

- ❑ Working SNIA Definition: A type of malicious software (malware) that prevents or limits users from accessing their system, applications, or data, or alternatively, to publish the user's data unless a "ransom" fee is paid
- ❑ CryptoLocker, CryptoWall
- ❑ WannaCry, Petya



What is Ransomware?

- ❑ Encryption of data
- ❑ Publication of data
- ❑ Prediction: Exfiltration of data or “Datanapping”
- ❑ Payment: Bitcoin, Premium SMS...
- ❑ “Phishing” bait, “You won’t believe...”
- ❑ Advertising networks



Ransomware Reach

- ❑ Popular file types
- ❑ Network shares
- ❑ Online backups
- ❑ Document previous versions/“Shadow Copies”
- ❑ Cloud accounts, “DropBox”



Universal Vector: Write Access

- ❑ Nefarious in their simplicity
- ❑ Indistinguishable from data deletion by users
- ❑ Behavioral detection cat and mouse
- ❑ Exfiltrate and delete are simply move & write 1X
- ❑ ***Self-inflicted, virtually no “Hacking” involved using user default write permissions***



“Just update your antivirus software”

- ❑ Write access is the primary attack vector
- ❑ Consider ‘sudo’ discreet privilege escalation
- ❑ Consider using web applications
- ❑ My informal poll reported *server-side attacks*
- ❑ *Restricting write permissions is the only file-level mitigation strategy*



Possible Warning Signs

- ❑ Out-of-space error as encrypted data replaces unencrypted data
- ❑ High write activity from encryption activity
- ❑ Actual encryption activity via tracing
- ❑ Unusual data exfiltration



Out of Band: Mitigation at the Block Level

- ❑ System administrator territory by definition
 - ❑ “Superuser” privileges at the file level
 - ❑ “Superuser” device control at the block level
- ❑ The oldest, simplest computer security model
- ❑ Reasonably file system-agnostic
- ❑ In-place/internal to the file system



Block-Level Versioning via Snapshotting

- ❑ Unrestricted user actions mandate “undo” ability
 - ❑ Outside user default permissions/reach
 - ❑ Ideally non-destructive undo
 - ❑ Ideally fine-grained/per-user and local
- ❑ Requires clear, coordinated RPO/RTO



Block-Level Versioning via Snapshotting

- ❑ RPO: Recovery Point Objective
 - ❑ Undo “Levels”/Timeframe
- ❑ RTO: Recovery Time Objective
 - ❑ Admin! Teacher! Help! I deleted all my data!
 - ❑ Clear SLA and procedures with users
 - ❑ Does your support infrastructure scale?



Block-Level Versioning via Snapshotting

- ❑ Benefits beyond Ransomware mitigation
- ❑ Ransomware is the motivator of the hour
- ❑ Assumption of snapshotting abilities in your FS



Snapshotting File Systems

- ❑ FreeBSD UFS2 Snapshots
- ❑ GNU/Linux LVM Snapshots
- ❑ Dragonfly BSD HammerFS
- ❑ GNU/Linux Btrfs Snapshots
- ❑ NTFS Volume Snapshot Service/Shadow Copies
- ❑ WAFL and Oracle ZFS Snapshots



Snapshotting File Systems

- ❑ Generally bolted-on functionality
- ❑ Often with performance impacts
- ❑ Some fine-grained, some not
- ❑ Few desktop/server/NAS-agnostic options



Institutionalized Snapshotting: OpenZFS

- ❑ Copy-On-Write (COW)
 - ❑ Write and dereference, rather than overwrite
 - ❑ Organized by sequential Transaction Groups
 - ❑ Universal opportunity to snapshot
 - ❑ New data = deltas aside existing data



Institutionalized Snapshotting: OpenZFS

- ❑ Institutionalized snapshotting allows...
 - ❑ Fine-grained at dataset “File System” level
 - ❑ Writable snapshots in the form of Clones
 - ❑ Clones allow for forensic preservation
 - ❑ Promotable to independent File Systems
 - ❑ Foundation of OpenZFS replication



Other OpenZFS Features

- ❑ Institutionalized checksumming
 - ❑ Merkel tree, no “UPS problem”
- ❑ ZVOL synthetic block device support
 - ❑ Flexible size, quotas, block size
 - ❑ Foreign File System support
 - ❑ Local attached and iSCSI/FC availability



Other OpenZFS Features

- ❑ Open Source
- ❑ Cross platform/endian-agnostic
- ❑ Nestable Datasets for fine-grained control
- ❑ Supports “hybrid” flash read/write acceleration
- ❑ Highly flexible, unlimited snapshots
- ❑ Enough features for two books: zfsbook.com



OpenZFS in Practice: Operating Systems

- ❑ OpenSolaris come Illumos and derivatives
- ❑ FreeBSD and derivatives
- ❑ GNU/Linux with legal uncertainty
- ❑ macOS for data partitions



OpenZFS in Practice: Availability to Users

- ❑ Local File System and block device access
- ❑ Network File Sharing
 - ❑ SMB, NFS, AFP, FTP etc.
- ❑ Network block sharing or image on File System
 - ❑ iSCSI, FibreChannel, RAW IMG, VMDK etc.
- ❑ Unlimited client/guest Operating Systems



File and Block: Herein Lies the Flexibility

- ❑ Network File Sharing
 - ❑ Flexible Ransomware “undo” ability
 - ❑ Per-directory, per-user
- ❑ Network block sharing or image on File System
 - ❑ Per-LUN, per-virtual machine
 - ❑ Also mitigate unclean VM shutdown



Think About Your RPO and Retention

- ❑ When to Snapshot?
 - ❑ Daily? Hourly? Every five minutes?
 - ❑ Running out of space is resolvable
 - ❑ Losing historic granularity is *not*
 - ❑ During business hours?
 - ❑ Usage-driven shapshotting



Think About Your RPO and Retention

- ❑ Your RPO drives your snapshot frequency
- ❑ What retention policy?
 - ❑ The Long Holiday problem
 - ❑ “Backup” goals
 - ❑ Archiving obligations
 - ❑ Primary, secondary, tertiary storage?



Policy-Driven Technology

- ❑ Technical flexibility enables policy flexibility
- ❑ Talk to your users about their work habits
- ❑ Talk to your lawyers about retention obligations

*Ransomware is a Wake Up Call
For Many Perennial Issues*



Mitigating Ransomware In Practice

- ❑ Statistically requires an OS migration
- ❑ Many NAS/SAN appliance options
 - ❑ FreeBSD-Based: FreeNAS, QNAP
 - ❑ Illumos-Based: Syneto, Nexenta
 - ❑ GNU/Linux-Based: Datto



Mitigating Ransomware In Practice

- ❑ My Experience is with FreeBSD and FreeNAS
- ❑ Open Source solutions enable full support
- ❑ Broadest user feedback scope
- ❑ Culture of vendor and individual contribution
- ❑ Excellent overlap with SNIA activities



Regardless of the Platform You Choose...

- ❑ Establish and maintain redundancy
- ❑ Flexible and scalable RaidZ/stripe of mirrors
- ❑ Create Datasets based on policy/org chart
- ❑ Create ZVOL block devices as needed
- ❑ Determine a snapshot and retention policy
- ❑ Share your datasets and block devices



Regardless of the Platform You Choose...

- ❑ Periodic “scrubs” validate all data checksums
- ❑ Replaced failed storage devices as needed
- ❑ Watch their S.M.A.R.T. data
- ❑ Determine expected performance
- ❑ Recognize degraded performance



Red Alert!

- ❑ Communication comes first
 - ❑ Shortens Recovery Time
 - ❑ Stops the spread of the Ransomware
 - ❑ Helps prevents future infection
- ❑ Educate users avoid Ransomware
- ❑ Educate users recognize an attack



Red Alert!

- ❑ Infected systems will re-infect – cleanse them
- ❑ Clearly communicate what data is impacted
- ❑ Decide if forensic information is desirable
- ❑ Determine if critical data exceeded the Restore Point – adjust accordingly
- ❑ *Learn from every experience*



Under the Hood

```
zfs list -t snapshot
```

NAME	USED	AVAIL	REFER	MOUNTPOINT
myvol/users@2017-09-10	0	-	780K	-

```
zfs snapshot myvol/users@2017-09-11
```

```
zfs clone myvol/users@2017-09-10 myvol/users@recover
```

```
zfs rollback myvol/users@2017-09-10
```





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Thank you!

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