

Persistent Data for Secured Containers

A Realizable Vision?

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Agenda

- Container Environment
- Securing Data
 - ... at Rest
 - ... in Use
 - ... in Motion
- Long Term Research
- Conclusion







Container Environment

Application Environment



Mount points

Host Operating System Access controls
Filesystems
Physical device drivers





Virtualized Application Environment





Containerized Environment









Containerized Storage Interface





Container Native Storage





Managed Kubernetes



Managed Kubernetes













Securing Data at Rest

File Based Encryption



ints

Host Operating System Access controls
Encrypting Filesystem
Physical device drivers





File Based Encryption

- Filenames may still be visible
 - Can disclose sensitive information
- Keys may be vulnerable
 - Protected by a weak user password
 - Administrative access is compromised
- Encryption overhead



Sources of Non-Encrypted Data

- Swap space
- Temporary files (/tmp, local working copies)
- Log files
- Free disk blocks with copies of data
- Overprovisioned space on SSDs



Full Disk Encryption



Host Operating System Access controls
Filesystems
Full disk encryption
Physical device drivers

Encrypted Data





Self Encrypting Drives



Mount points

Host Operating System Access controls	
Filesystems	
Physical device drivers	

Self-Encrypting Drives





Storage Area Network





Disaggregated Storage





Kubernetes

- Enabled through Storage Class
- Defined with a yaml file
- The exact syntax is specific to each storage provisioner
- E.g., with EBS based storage:

```
apiVersion: storage.k8s.io/v1
kind: StorageClass
metadata:
   name: slow
provisioner: kubernetes.io/aws-ebs
parameters:
   type: io1
   iopsPerGB: "10"
   fsType: ext4
   encrypted: "true"
```







Securing Data in Use

Secure Enclave



Confidential Computing

Confidential Computing Consortium

- Linux Foundation project to define and accelerate adoption
- https://confidentialcomputing.io/
- Hardware support
 - Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) isolates applications
 - AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization isolates VMs
 - ARM TrustZone
- Offered by major cloud providers
- E.g., Microsoft Azure
 - Application Enclaves securely run an application
 - Confidential VMs run a virtual machine, with optional full disk encryption
 - Confidential Containers

Confidential Kubernetes Nodes

Managed Kubernetes

Confidential Containers

Occlum

- Memory-safe, multi-process library OS for Intel SGX
- Written in rust for memory safety
- https://github.com/occlum/occlum

Gramine

- Lightweight library OS with Intel SGX support
- Designed to run a single application
- Minimal host requirements
- <u>https://github.com/gramineproject/gramine</u>

Securing Data in Motion

S3 Object Store

File I/O

- Occlum supports multiple filesystems
- Read-only hashed filesystem
 - For integrity protection
- Writable encrypted filesystem
 - For confidentiality protection
- Untrusted host filesystem
 - For data exchange with the host OS

Storage Performance Development Kit (SPDK)

Tools and libraries for writing:

- High performance, scalable
- User-mode storage applications

Cutting Edge

- Leverage the latest NVMe features
- Poll-mode and event-loop for maximum performance
- Lockless, thread-per-core design

https://www.spdk.io

Direct Connect

Kubernetes

Long Term Research

CHERI (Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions)

- Joint research project between SRI International and the University of Cambridge
- Revisit fundamental design choices to dramatically improve system security
- Extends instruction set to enable fine-grained memory protection
 - Pointers have associated bounds and permissions
 - Invalid memory references throw an exception
- Long-term direction is towards software compartmentalization
 - Hardware 'capabilities' enforce software isolation
 - Granular and scalable data sharing

https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/ctsrd/cheri/

Arm Morello Program

- Five-year research program (launched in 2019)
- Defines a new prototype security architecture based on CHERI (Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions)
- Morello is a research and prototyping program
 - To determine if Morello prototype architecture is viable
 - To create more secure hardware architecture for processors of the future
- System on Chip (SoC) implementation of the architecture
 - Will provide a Digital Security by Design (DSdB) technology platform prototype
 - Enabling industry and academic partners to test real-world use cases and inform future development
- https://www.arm.com/morello

Conclusion

Conclusion

- Security is always a trade off between:
 - Sensitivity of the data
 - Risk
 - Practicality
 - Cost
- In a containerized environment, securing data:
 - At rest, is vendor specific, but straightforward
 - In use, is achievable but has higher costs and is in the 'early adopters' phase
 - In motion, is viable with an object store, but cutting edge for block storage

Questions?

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