

How to Protect the Integrity of Electronic Components and Storage Devices from Supply Chain Attacks

Thorsten Stremlau, Marketing Work Group Co-Chair Trusted Computing Group (TCG)



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
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
## Strategic Planning Assumptions

«Most organizations' security processes consider only the visible state of computing devices. The **provenance** and **integrity** of a delivered device and its **components** are typically accepted without validating through technology that there have been no unexpected modifications.»

«**Provenance** is the comprehensive history of a device throughout the entire life cycle from creation to ownership, including changes made within the device or its components.»




year-over-year increase in supply chain attacks




of global businesses have encountered at least one supply chain scare since shifting to a remote working model in the first quarter of 2022

 By 2025, 60% of organizations building or procuring critical infrastructure components (SW&HW) will mandate and standardize Supply Chain Trust principles into their engineering practice, up from less than 20% in 2022 (Gartner, Feb 2022 G00761079)

## The importance of a securing hardware in transit



https://youtu.be/C7H3V7tkxeA






## Important Regulatory and Standards work:

- NIST SP800-161r1 (Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Systems and Organizations)
- NIST SP1800-34 (Validating the Integrity of Computing Devices: Preliminary Draft)
- NIST SP800-193 (Platform Firmware Resiliency Guidelines)
- SBOM (Executive Order on Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity)
- TCG FIM (TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Integrity Measurement)
- TCG RIM (TCG Reference Integrity Manifest (RIM) Information Model)
- EU RED (COMMISSION DELEGATED REGULATION (EU) 2022/30)



### An Enterprise's Visibility, Understanding, and Control of its Supply Chain


#### NIST SP800-161r1





## NIST SP1800-34

### NIST 1800-34B. Notion Architecture





# SP800-193 defines Storage as critical boot device




Figure 1: High-Level System Architecture



### Firmware Software Bill of materials

https://blogs.gnome.org/hughsie/2022/03/10/firmware-software-bill-of-materials/





Figure 1: Conceptual SBOM graph

Component Name	Supplier	Version	Author	Hash	UID	Relationship
Application	Acme	1.1	Acme	0x123	234	Primary
Browser	Bob	2.1	Bob	0x223	334	Included in
Compression Engine	Carol	3.1	Acme	0x323	434	Included in
Buffer	Bingo	2.2	Acme	0x423	534	Included in




# TCG Firmware Integrity Measurement






## TCG Reference Integrity Manifest


Direct Indirect








## How it all fits together





## Summary









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